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The phenomena-logical description of the con-
stitution of meaningfulness and evidence often is 
presented (e.g., by the Husserl of the Cartesian 
Meditations and the Crisis) in terms of a metaphor-
ical vocabulary of "fields," "horizons," "streams," 
"flows," etc. Though other phenomenological themes 
have been recognized in some of Wittgenstein's writings, 
his use of these field and stream metaphors in describ-
ing his family resemblances or private language 
positions has generally received very little atten-
tion. Perhaps the reason for this stems from a 
healthy caution about reading too much into a possible 
Husserl-Wittgenstein connection. Such an attitude, 
however, is overly cautious in the case of the rela-
tionship of Wittgenstein to the psychological writings 
of William James. 
In Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
(PI) and Zettel (Z), there are repeated references to 
William James' Principles of Psychology (PP) and 
numerous passages which seem to parallel James' 
treatments of a number of topics. One of the meta-
phors which appears in James' and Wittgenstein's 
treatments of the meaningfulness of the ideas we have 
and the words we use to express them is the contrast 
of considering ideas either in terms of a "stream" of 
thought or in terms of a state or "field" of static 
relations. James' prime concern is to show that the 
ideas we have have significance and value primarily 
in terms of the stream of thought in which they 
appear. For example, in the Principles, James writes: 
Every definite image in the mind is steeped and 
dyed in the free water that flows around it. 
With it goes the sense of its relations, near 
and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to 
us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. 
The significance, the value, of the image is all 
in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and 
escorts it, — o r rather that is fused into one 
with it and has become bone of its bone and 
flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an 
image of the same thing it was before, but 
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making it an image of that thing newly taken and 
freshly understood. (PP_, I, p. 255) 
Wittgenstein is more concerned with the meaning 
words have for us, but he does feel that James' point 
goes to the very heart of the discussion concerning 
the fact that words have meaning in terms of their 
use within the stream of thought, life, and experience. 
This article is not a comparison of James and 
Wittgenstein on the stream of thought theme; nor is it 
meant to be a Jamesian interpretation of Wittgenstein 
on this theme. It is an examination of Wittgenstein's 
treatments of meaning, intention, and understanding 
(and the rules involved with the understanding and use 
of words) in terms of Wittgenstein's use of the stream 
and field metaphors. The results of such an examina-
tion shed light on how a number of passages in the 
PI and Z can be interpreted in terms of more familiar 
Wittgenstein!an themes (e.g., the family resemblances 
and private language discussions). 
I. Pictures in the Stream 
Throughout the PI^ and Z, Wittgenstein indicates 
that a proper description oF the "meaning" of words 
should consist of (1) a recognition that the meaning 
of a word is grounded in the stream of experience, 
and that "only in the stream [Flussl of thought and 
life do words have meaning" (Z_ 173) ; and (2) a recogni-
tion that the elements of the stream can be singled 
out or temporarily considered apart from the stream 
in order to understand further the content of experi-
ence. Admittedly, the abstraction necessary for this 
second characterization of the meaning of a word does 
remove the word from its life-giving surroundings; but 
for the purpose of trying to understand what the word 
means, we must, as it were, step outside of the stream 
in order to see how we are using and interpreting the 
word in the stream: 
If I see the thought symbol 'from outside', I 
become conscious that it could be interpreted 
this way and that way; if it is a step in the 
course of my thoughts, then it is a stopping-
place that is natural to me, and its further 
interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) 
me. (Z 235) 
In other words, seen "from the outside," a word 
is seen as the possibility of numerous meanings. The 
"course" or stream of thought, in the case of the 
second recognition mentioned above, is seen in terms 
of the steps and stopping-places which are seen as forming 
the content of experience. The meaning of a word is seen as 
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frozen in a particular place in the stream, defined by 
its relationships with other elements of the stream. 
The further interpretability of the word does not 
occupy us because the interpretation has fixed the 
content of the word, i.e., within the frozen stream. 
Indeed, the stream (once frozen) loses its char-
acter as stream and takes on the character of a state 
whose elements are actually fixed in their relation-
ships to one another. In this way, the stream, as 
stream, can be understood as a field of possible 
applications or relationships (Z_ 33.) The shift away 
from the on-going stream metaphor to the static field 
metaphor, however, is possible only when we continue to 
keep in mind the fact that, just as the meaning of a 
word is fringed in the stream by numerous relationships 
to other parts of the stream—relationships which 
become less and less clearly defined the farther 
forward and backward we look in the stream—so does 
this fringed character have to be maintained in our' 
discussions of the meaning of a word considered as 
static (i.e., as a field or as a "picture"). 2 in 
other words, when we investigate the contents of ex-
perience—images, for example (PI, p. 217)—we first 
must recognize their "lifeless and isolated" appear-
ance when considered outside of the stream (Z 233), 
and we must assume that any selection we make out of 
the stream—at least in order to approximate its 
appearance in the stream—is fringed with the possi-
bility of forming other connections of words and 
thoughts. 
The elements of the stream, therefore, are 
fringed, just as the fields or the pictures (the 
stopping places) have fringes. Wittgenstein's dis-
cussion of these fringes is expressed in a number of 
metaphors: there are "shadows" of intention, concepts 
with "blurred edges," thoughts surrounded by "halos," 
"echoes," "an atmosphere," "an aura," "a corona," 
"half-shades." 4 The indefinite nature of the ex-
perience of the meaning of a word must be lifted out 
of the stream when we attempt to explain the difference 
between the meanings of various words. To Wittgen-
stein's question "Is there one difference of meaning 
that can be explained and another that does not come 
into daylight lzu Tage—note the contrast with "shadows" 
(Schatten)1 in an explanation?" (Z 156) , we might 
answer (in a characteristically Wittgensteinian way): 
"Yes and No." Insofar as the picture-meaning of a 
word we have abstracted from the stream attempts to 
maintain the blurred edges which characterize "it" 
in the stream—and here I do not mean to imply that 
the stream blurs that which was previously clear—some 
difference of meaning between the word in other uses, 
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or the word as compared to other words, could be 
explained and some difference of meaning could not. 
However, because of the blurred character of the 
picture-meaning of the word, apparently more than one 
difference of meaning could be explained, and more than 
one difference of meaning could not come out in any 
explanation. 
II. Intention, Meaning, and the Stream 
When we concentrate upon the stream character of 
the meaning of words and try to describe the meaning 
of a word according to the way we think it appears in 
the stream, we find that once we have selected a section 
of the stream or interpreted a section of the "space 
of intention" (Z_ 233) in such a way as to yield a 
picture, the meaning of the word "is suddenly dead" 
(Z 236). That is, once a picture of a word is fashioned 
within the stream, it can tell us little about the 
meaning of the word, i_f we assume that the meaning 
of the word is the intention an individual has in using 
the word or the interpretation he gives to a somehow 
already defined picture. But this is precisely the 
description which Wittgenstein wants to do away with; 
to view intention and meaning as something which 
surrounds an object, a sign, a symbol—in brief, a 
picture—is to deny the importance of considering 
the question of meaning in the context of the stream: 
"If this intending, this meaning, is in turn something 
done with a picture, then I cannot see why that has 
to involve a human being" (Z_ 236) . Meaning is not 
something done with a picture, for this would imply 
that the picture itself is fashioned apart from the 
influence of my intentions as interpreting the content 
of experience into pictures. The picture itself is 
an interpretation of the intention which characterizes 
a particular locus of the stream. However, because 
Wittgenstein is interested in the further description 
of the meaning of a word, he feels justified in 
"taking a slice" (as it were) of the stream. 
In making such a selection, in painting such a 
picture, we run the risk of thinking that the picture 
is the interpretation of the intention, and that this 
picture is the one meant when an individual intends a 
meaning for a word: this, again, assumes the priority 
of a picture whose elements are already given. Ad-
mittedly, Wittgenstein does allow for the fact that 
the content of experience does include "natural" 
stopping-places or "real things" which are the terminal 
points of relations realized in the stream: "when we 
intend, we are surrounded by our intention's pictures, 
and we are inside them. . . . When we intend, we exist 
in the spaces of intention, among the pictures (shadows) 
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of intention, as well as with real things" (Z_ 233) . 
In the stream we are surrounded on all sides by real 
things which become meaningful insofar as they are 
recognized (or "cognized") as being related to our 
perspective in the stream (i.e., to our intention). 
The phrase "the intended meaning of a word" primarily 
refers to the fact that elements (the "real things") 
of the stream have been connected in the stream 
(and, therefore, actualize certain relationships 
and exclude the possibility of others). Elements 
in the stream, however, are not said to have an 
aura, a halo, or an atmosphere about them, because 
their very place in the stream (their surroundings 
and atmosphere) determine what the objects are: 
"Thus the. atmosphere that is inseparable from its 
object—is not an atmosphere" (Pl_, p. 183) . The 
object is a "real-thing"-in-relation, i.e., a thing-
in-the-stream. 
But here is where we continually have to pull 
ourselves back into emphasizing the priority of the 
stream and the need to start with the intention, and 
then work back to the picturing, rather than vice 
versa. To make the picture prior is to admit of 
different interpretations for the picture—which is 
to imply that our stream of experience is really 
numerous streams. Wittgenstein, however, proposes 
that such a description of the stream of experience 
is incorrect. In itself, the picture is capable of 
numerous interpretations and of, therefore, numerous 
meanings; but no meaningful picture is seen "in itself"; 
it is always seen as an intended picture (Z_ 2 3 3 ) — o r 
more precisely, a picture within intention—not a 
picture of the intention. 
This point is of prime interest in interpreting 
the passage, which I have quoted above, in which 
Wittgenstein says that when we intend, we are sur-
rounded by the pictures of our intention; and, that 
at any point in the stream, there is only one intention 
and only one meaning to a word or thought (however 
blurred that meaning is)—this, because the stream 
itself is singular. However, the elements of experi-
ence which are connected (and in a sense made what 
they are) through the intention, form the pictures 
(note the plural) of our intention. These pictures 
have life only in the flow of the stream or, as 
Wittgenstein calls it, in the space {Raum) of inten-
tion. 5 But because of the fleeting nature of inten-
tion,6 i.e., because of the on-going movement of the 
stream, the relationships of "real things" are "pic-
tured" in terms of the intention in a fleeting or 
shadowy manner. This is why Wittgenstein refers 
parenthetically to the pictures of the intention as 
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shadows: they are defined only to the extent that an 
individual is interested in defining them, i.e., to the 
extent that the intention demands: "the intention seems 
to interpret, to give the final interpretation; which is 
not a further sign or picture, but something else—the 
thing that cannot be further interpreted. But what we 
have reached is a psychological, not a logical, terminus" 
(Z 231). The final interpretation occurs in the course 
of the stream (the psychological terminus) and does not 
allow for further interpretation, because no further 
interpretation is made in the stream. ("What happens 
is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, 
but: I do no interpreting. I do not interpret, because 
I feel at home in the present picture" [Z 234].) The 
relationships and connections in the stream are thematized 
according to the intention which is operative at that 
point in the stream: "Describing an intention means 
describing what went on from a particular point of view, 
with a particular purpose. I paint a particular portrait 
of what went on" (Z 23) . But this does not imply that the 
characterization oF the elements of experience and their 
relations are specified in any way other than to the de-
gree appropriate to the intention. 
To compare concepts is to compare streams of thought 
(which, as we shall see below, is to compare ways of 
understanding). The ways that a word is used and the 
ways that concepts are formed depend upon the character 
of the stream. The narrower the stream and the more 
definite the concept, the more likely we are to think 
of the possibility that our pictures could symbolize 
the indefiniteness of our concept.'' 
The character of the picture, however, is specified 
to the extent that the intention is specified, i.e., to 
the extent that the stream is said to be this or that 
particular (personal) stream. The more varied the stream 
— w e might say to continue the metaphor, the wider and 
slower moving the stream—the less likelihood that the 
poet's words, for example, can "pierce" us—"and that 
is of course causally connected with the use that those 
words have in our life. And it is also connected with 
the way in which, conformably to this use, we let our 
thoughts roam up and down in the familiar surroundings 
of the words" (Z 155). Insofar as we allow our con-
cepts indefiniteness, we allow their meanings to be 
more and more vague and open ourselves up to new and 
perhaps striking usages of these words. 
Again, Wittgenstein's language abounds in metaphors 
of movements: different streams are those in which life 
"runs on" differently (Z 388); the concepts of others 
"cut across" ours (Z 379) ; the extent to which the 
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poet's words pierce us is connected with the way we let 
our thoughts "roam up and down" in the familiar sur-
roundings of the words (Z_ 155) . The emphasis on move-
ment is an important counterbalance to Wittgenstein's 
description of meaning in terms which often exphasize 
the static content of meaningful words.8 
The on-going, flowing connotation of the meaning 
of words places special emphasis on the temporal descrip-
tion of the stream. A word has meaning in the present 
not only because of the fact that it is an interpreta-
tion of the inter-related elements in the stream at the 
present point in the stream, but also because of the 
fact that these elements are related to elements beyond 
the vague limits of that section of the stream which we 
select out for close scrutiny. In other words, previous 
elements in the stream affect the way that present 
pictures are constructed and seen when we look into the 
meaning of a particular word we use. Likewise, future 
elements in the stream influence the make-up of the 
meaning of a word as it appears in the present section 
of the stream. The past and future are internally 
related to the present to the extent that any discussion 
of the meaning of words must provide for the fact that 
the intended picture (or "object") appears as it does 
because of the influence of the past on the present 
intention and the backward-reaching echoes of the future 
on the present intention: 
What I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is 
not a property of the object, but an internal 
relation between it and other objects. It is 
almost as if 'seeing the sign in this context' 
were an echo of a thought. 'The echo of a 
thought in sight'—one would like to say. 
(PI, p. 212) 
What the metaphor of the stream indicates is that 
"intention" is the complexion (or form, arrangement) of 
the "real things" in the stream (i.e., the contents of 
experience). These real things do not become meaningful 
until they are cognized as objects (i.e., placed in re-
lationships to other things) in the personal stream of 
experience. The "meaning" of a word refers to the com-
bination of form and matter, of arrangement and compo-
nents (with the understanding, though, that the compo-
nents or objects themselves are what they are partially 
because of the intention). 
Because of the temporal aspect of the stream, Witt-
genstein finds that we are faced with a problem when we 
attempt to describe the experience of the meaning of a 
word. For when we use a word without, as it were, 
"watching ourselves" using the word, we have a different 
intention—and, therefore, are surrounded by different 
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pictures—than if we were trying to describe the way we 
use a word» concentrating on "seeing" its meaning for 
us. The very concentrating on attempting to see the 
meaning—i.e., how we use the word—influences how we 
do, in fact, use the word. Thus, we fail to describe 
the "real" meaning which we intended for the word 
because the intentions in the stream have changed. In 
fact, when I attempt to explain the experience of mean-
ing, I imply that I can step outside of the stream to 
take a look at what "I" experienced in some other 
(previous) part of the stream: as Wittgenstein asks, 
"But isn't it true, then, that the word means that to 
me now? Why not? . . . 'When I uttered the word just 
now, it meant to me.' Why should that not be 
mere lunacy? Because I experienced that? That is not 
a reason" (Z_. 181-182) 7^ When I am conscious of my 
meaning a word, the consciousness of my intending that 
meaning itself contributes to the characterization of 
the meaning of the word: this is why the meaning is 
said to be different. 
The important question which grows out of this 
particular discussion is: Can I ever know what I mean 
when I use a word, or can I ever know what I meant when 
I have used a word? According to the points we have 
just seen, it would appear that we would have to answer 
with an unqualified "No" to the first part of this 
question and with a qualified "No" to the second part 
— w i t h the second "No" being contingent on there not 
being an internal relationship between the present, 
past, and future "parts" of the stream. That is, to 
some extent I can know what I meant when I have used a 
word, because the meaning of the word I have used 
"echoes" in my present use of the word, either (1) in 
virtue of the echoing effect set up by the bare similar-
ity of the contents of the experience (e.g., the visual 
or auditory images), or (2) in virtue of the echoing 
effect set up by the characterization of these elements 
(i.e., the effect set up by the intention), or (3) in 
virtue of both content and intention echoes. (Some 
familiar expressions might illustrate the distinctions I 
am setting up here among these three echo conditions. 
For example, in regard to content echoes: "I don't 
remember using it, but if I used the word "gargoyle," 
I must have meant . . . "; in regard to intention echoes: 
"It really doesn't matter what I said, just as long as 
you got my message"; and in regard to a combination of 
echoes: "I tried to express it, as I remember, as best 
I c o u l d . " ) 1 0 
The problematic way of speaking about meaning in 
terms of the stream strikes Wittgenstein most when 
he begins to ask himself whether someone can use 
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words meaningfully/ even though that person is only 
vaguely aware of how he wants his words to be under-
stood. For example, while thinking about two dif-
ferent friends, he sits down to write a letter; 
the question arises: "Can I be in doubt which of 
the two I was writing to? H {Z_ 7) . The implied answer 
seems to be "Yes," and not only for the reason that 
later on he can decide on which one to send it to. 
The letter can still be meaningful even though it is 
not sent to either one, if the intention which was 
operative at the time of the writing simply demanded 
that the reader be someone like the two friends. 
In short, there is no need to conclude that the 
meaning of a word becomes more specified the farther into 
the past and future we characterize or specify relation-
ships. When I mean something, I need not imply— 
indeed, it is doubtful whether I can imply—that the 
ripples of future elements in the stream of experience 
indicate, any more than in a vague manner, what the 
character of those future elements are. With the 
exception of those experiences which are in the very 
near future and which we feel we have control over 
(such as willing to move our arm), most future ele-
ments are anticipated in a shadowy way, because 
they are (from the present perspective) overwhelmingly 
determined by their "future-ness. B This is what 
Wittgenstein is alluding to when he remarks that 
"the shadowy anticipation of a fact consists in 
this: we can now think that that thing will happen 
which only will happen" (Z 6 2 f 7 The dominant aspect 
of an anticipated fact is that it is anticipated; it is 
not first and foremost a determined fact which just 
so happens to be further along in the stream. It 
has an indeterminate and shadowy character because 
of what it is in the present. When (and ifJ that 
element of the stream becomes an object in a present 
field of experience, then it will have become, in 
fact, a different object: "if the indefiniteness 
were missing we should also not have 'the same thing 
meant'" (Z 381). 
Wittgenstein wants to maintain that in some sense 
the future meaning of the word we use in tHe present 
is present when we use i t — i t "anticipates" reality. 
But the reality which is anticipated is shadowy because 
of its being in the future-in-terms-of-the-present. 
Such a shadowy description of the future aspect 
of the meaning of the word is demanded by the fact 
we never "physically arrive," in the present, at 
the realization of the determinate future meanings 
of the word we presently use. This is the area 
for caution for Wittgenstein; we should not think 
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that 
when you meant it your mind as it were flew 
ahead and took all the steps before you phy-
sically arrived at this or that one. Thus 
you inclined to use such expressions as: 
'The steps are really already taken, even 
before I take them in writing or orally 
or in thought.' And it seemed as if they 
were in some unique way pre-determined, 
anticipated—as only the act of meaning 
can anticipate reality. (PI^ 188) 
But even if, in meaning a word, we do not take all 
the steps—i.e., we do not completely anticipate 
reality—in some "unique way" we still do anticipate 
reality, and future reality is in a sense pre-
determined because the present echoes in the future. 
But the puzzling and yet necessarily true description 
of the meaning of our words in the stream lies in 
the fact that the future is echoing in the present. 
To grasp the whole use of a word in a flash (in 
the present), then, 
becomes queer when we are led to think that 
the future development must in some way al-
ready be present in the act of grasping the 
use and yet isn't present. For we say that 
there isn't any doubt that we understand the 
word, and on the other hand its meaning lies 
in its use. . . . Don't I know, then, which 
game I want to play until I have played it? 
or are all the rules contained in my act of 
intending? . . . is it impossible for me to 
be certain what I am indending to do? (PI^ 197) 
Wittgenstein's point here, just as in the letter-
writing example, is that I might be uncertain as 
to what I am in fact intending to do or to m e a n — 
but a higher degree of certainty might not be re-
quired by my present state of mind—i.e., certainty 
to the extent that it is appropriate for me to be 
certain or to understand the word. The game that 
I know I want to play in the future is in some sense 
a different game when I am playing it in the present; 
because, before I play the game, it is seen as a 
future part of the stream, but when I play it, it is 
characterized by the present intention of the stream. 
III. The Field Aspects of Meaning 
Even though the stream-like description of mean-
ing holds a position of primacy in Wittgenstein's 
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discussion, he does not want to ignore the more 
static aspects of the meanings of words. And in 
this regard, we have to consider the matter in two 
different, though related, ways. 
First, when we attempt to talk about the meaning 
of the words we use in more than their stream-like 
character, we first "freeze" or "take a slice" of 
the stream—i.e., we see that part of the stream 
in terms of a picture. The important point to keep 
in mind in the selection of such a picture is that 
the edges of the picture are to be left sufficiently 
blurred so as to approximate the lively, moving 
character of the stream. The complexion of the 
picture, of course, will determine, to some extent, 
what those edges will look like; that is, the blurred 
edges of the picture are the edges of this picture, 
and, therefore, have characteristics which the edges 
of other pictures would not have. 
This is an important point, not only to show 
how this first way of speaking about meaning 
"statically" differs from the second way (which 
we will describe below), but also to show that the 
complexion (or intention) of the stream at any point 
indicates the limits of the possible meanings that 
a word can have. In this way, the intention excludes 
other possible meanings that the word can have in 
the stream. The complexion of the stream indicates— 
albeit in a blurred way—that the stream can move in 
certain directions or "paths"—(and the plural is im-
portant here!—which are thus made real possibilities 
(instead of "pure" possibilities) and-""familiar" 
paths. When Wittgenstein writes that "the possibility 
of this movement roust be the possibility of just 
this movement," what he is indicating is that, in 
the stream, future possibilities become limited without 
becoming actual: real possibility is, indeed, "some-
thing very near reality" (PI 194)—and here "reality" 
refers to that which is actual, i.e., that which is 
"realized" in the present part of the stream. The 
past and future are real insofar as they are "echoing" 
in the present, and the various past and future uses 
(meanings) of the words we presently use are "familiar" 
to the way we presently use the words, insofar as 
they are real possibilities. So when Wittgenstein 
remarks tfiat ."a multitude of familiar paths lead off 
from these words in every direction" (PI_ 525 and 534) , 
he is saying not only that certain remarks spur us 
to familiar insights, but also that those insights 
are in some sense anticipated because of their familial 
realtionship to what is focal for us at present.H 
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To speak about this first way to describe the static 
aspect of meaning is to emphasize the picture metaphor 
— i . e . , the metaphor in which a picture is seen in terms 
of the stream, as having blurred edges or a "halo." But, 
as Wittgenstein notes, someone would never have thought 
that a sentence or a thought had such a halo, atmosphere, 
or aura which might be separated from it if he had not 
thought "of how one might say it differently" (PI_ 607) . 
That is, only when we consider the fact that the 
sentence or thought must primarily be understood in 
terms of that which gives it its life and meaning (viz., 
the stream of thought or experience), can we appreciate 
the fact that familiar (somewhat determinate) paths 
lead off from our words "in every direction," i.e., 
indicating numerous real possibilities for the applica-
tion or futher picturing of our words. 
The second way to describe the static aspect of 
meaning is presupposed by the first: if the first way, 
as it were, "pictures" the real possibilities or paths 
which are cognized as "familiar" in terms of the present 
part of the stream, then such a description would assume 
an order of pure possibilities or paths (relationships) 
which are capable of perhaps becoming real possibilities 
in terms of some stream. When these pure possibilities 
become real possibilities in terms of this or that 
particular stream (i.e., when they are cognized as the 
possibilities referred to in the blurred edges of 
pictures), they have the capacity of becoming realized, 
cognized objects in some part of the particular stream. 
Logic presents the description of this twice-removed-
from-the-stream order of pure possibility: 
Thought is surrounded by a halo. — I t s essence, 
logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori 
order of the world: that is, the order of 
possibilities, which must be common to both 
world and thought. . . . It is prior to all 
experience, must run through all experience; 
no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can 
be allowed to affect it. (PI 97) 
In spite of the fact that this passage is an expres-
sion of a position which Wittgenstein held in the 
Tractatus and with which he is now uncomfortable, he is 
not rejecting the position that an a posteriori logic is 
possible. That is, the juxtaposition of the first 
sentence of this passage ("Thought is surrounded by a 
halo") with the denial of empirical cloudiness in logic 
(at the end of the passage) highlights Wittgenstein's 
later claim that meaningfulness in possibilities is 
determined according to the actualities which surround 
thoughts in the stream in a "halo-like" manner. 
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The real world, however, is the cloudy and uncertain 
realm of the stream of experience; this perhaps becomes 
"clarified" when we abstract pictures (or halo-sur-
rounded thoughts) from the stream; and when we go that 
one step further, not only removing the distinction' 
between actual relationships (or actualities) and real 
possibilities-not-yet-actualities, but also removing the 
distinction between real possibilities and pure pos-
sibilities, we see how the order described in logic is 
indeed far removed from, though in the "logical" order 
prior to, meaning and life. 
The pure logical relatedness of elements is the 
bare minimum requirement for meaningfulness; that is, 
logical relatedness is in a minimal sense meaningful 
as an abstraction from (or an interpretation of) the 
more meaningful but more blurred level of pictures; 
these pictures are, in turn, meaningful as abstractions 
from (or interpretations of) the stream of thought and 
life. By themselves, the interpretations do not deter-
mine meaning (PI 198), although they do indicate how 
we can speak about meaning in terms of the various 
"levels of thought" implicit in the stream: "when I 
interpret, I step from one level to thought to another" 
(Z 234). That is, the more I interpret the meaning of 
a word I' use, the more I make determinate that which in 
the stream had meaning and life because of its relative 
indeterminateness. The more I try to give the stream 
the character of a field, the more it will appear that 
an element, isolated from its place in both, the stream 
and the picture, has meaning in itself: 
If a sentence can strike me as like a painting 
in words, and the very individual word in the 
sentence as like a picture, then it is no such 
marvel that a word uttered in isolation and 
without purpose can seem to carry a particular 
meaning in itself. ( M , p. 215) 
Again, Wittgenstein's warning is that in order for our 
words to have meaning, they must have meaning primarily 
in terms of the stream—i.e., the stream must be our 
starting point; to start at the level of logic is to 
admit that words do have meaning in themselves, i.e., 
as distinct from their being elements in the stream 
and components found in picture-objects. 
When we intend, we are surrounded by the pictures 
of our intention: above, I emphasized what Wittgenstein 
means by this in terms of the stream metaphor. But we 
can also interpret him in terms of the more static 
field image, if we recognize that just as a sentence or 
thought can be seen as a "field [Feld1 of force" that 
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is decisive in determining the meaning of a word (PI, 
p. 219), so also individual pictures ("themes," 
"objects") can be statically interpreted as meaningful 
in terras of the "whole field (Feld) of our language-
games" (Z 175). However, when we begin to compare 
various ways in which we use words, what we do is com-
pare various parts of the stream to one another. Or, 
to put it simply, we treat the stream as the "whole 
field of our language-games." This use of the word 
"field" would be misleading if we were to conclude 
from it that the stream is, in fact, a field. The 
major advance, in Wittgenstein's own eyes, of the 
Investigations over the Tractatus is precisely in his 
recognition that the description of meaning should 
proceed from the viewpoint of the stream to inter-
preting meaning as field—first in terms of pictures 
and, then, in terms of logic:—not (as in the Tractatus) 
from the starting point of a description of pictures 
and, then, to directing our explanation toward the logi-
cal substructure of those pictures. 
IV. The Rules of Language-Games: "Understanding" in 
Stream and Field 
Seen in terms of the stream of experience, the 
"rules" of the various language-games we play refer to 
the general reasons we give to justify our speaking of 
some objects in the stream—and, therefore, the paths 
or routes of relationships to those objects—as 
"familiar." Objects (or "pictures") further along in 
the stream are familiar insofar as they refer to (i.e., 
are in accord with or are not in accord with) the rules 
which describe how elements in the present part of the 
stream are related to one another as establishing the 
condition of meaningfulness. The rules of a game which 
an individual has not as yet played are less determinate 
(actual, real) than those which describe the game he 
presently plays—but this does not mean that he does 
not have, at least in some sense, a picture of a game 
in advance of his playing it. However, the picture he 
has of a future game describes a future configuration 
of the stream in_ terms of, and from the perspective of, 
the present game. 
The meanings of the words we use, therefore, will 
be familiar insofar as those usages are allowed for in 
the rules or technique of the game we intend to play or 
assume ourselves to be playing.12 what our words mean 
in the future are already in some sense "pictured" in 
the present: we are playing games whose rules are often 
vague (PI^ 100) , perhaps even unknown to the person 
playing the game (PI^ 82, 679) , and capable of having 
different roles in the game (i.e., different applica-
tions and, therefore, indicating different meanings in 
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the stream) (P_I 53) . We are entangled in our rules 
because we are caught up in the stream, and the rules 
we envision for the use of our words are determinate 
only to the extent that the future is determinate in 
the present. 
The rules of a game tend both to indicate how the 
game should be played (i.e., how the game should progress) 
and to describe, within certain general limits, what we 
should see if we were to freeze the progress of the game 
at any point. Or in terms of our discussion here, rules 
are Wittgenstein's way of speaking about the character-
istics of the formal appearance (or intention) of the 
stream of thought and life. That is, the rules accord-
ing to which we determine the meanings of words we use 
are gleaned from our recognition of how, in fact, we 
use the words in the stream. In painting a picture of 
any point of the stream, we see a portrait with a 
certain formal structure (or set of rules) which attempts 
to explain the meaning of the word we use at the same 
time as indicating (through the very vagueness of the 
rules) that such a picture should not be interpreted 
apart from considering it as in the stream. 
Rules are the formal links between pictures in the 
stream. Or to put thi3 in another way, if_ we were to 
see the stream as a series of continually overlaping 
pictures (or "objects of experience"), then the rules 
which we would imagine as indicating how the elements 
of those pictures have meaning could be "read off" of 
the pictures. Unfortunately, because the pictures are 
seen to overlap, i.e., because of the primacy of the 
stream, the rules we read off of the pictures can only 
generally explain the meanings of the words we use. In 
order for us to describe fully what the understanding 
of the meaning of a word involves, we must try to read 
the rules off of the stream itself—that is, off of the 
way the words are used;—we must try to imagine the rules 
of the intention itself, instead of concentrating only 
on the pictures of the intention. Thus, the descrip-
tion of understanding must involve discussions both of 
the rules indicated in the "explanations" given by the 
more static picture or field images, as well as of the 
rules (i.e., the "training") which are (is) found in 
the movement of the stream: "Understanding is effected 
by explanation; but also by training" (£ 186). 
Understanding, according to Wittgenstein, has 
characteristics of both the field and the stream, the 
state and the process. Understanding is both a state 
(PI, p. 59n) having characteristics of processes (PI 
154") , as well as a process or act having characteristics 
of a state (e.g., an "atmosphere") (PI 609 & Z 217) . 
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Understanding is an interpreting of the elements of the 
stream in such a way as to see those elements now as 
one object (or picture) and now as another object (or 
picture). 
Interpreting the content of the stream is not neces-
sarily the same as making an interpretation of the stream: 
"You see it conformably, not to an interpretation, but to 
an act of interpreting" (Z 217), To equate the two would 
be to lessen the influence the interpreting has on the 
very makeup of the content of the stream: the elements 
of the stream are what they are because they are in the 
stream. When the act of interpreting (i.e., the inten-
tion) is "seen" as an interpretation, the seeing becomes 
a state—a "seeing according to an interpretation" (Z 
212; PI, p. 200)—that is, it yields a picture. 
I want to ask: what constitutes seeing the 
figure now like this, now another w a y ? — D o 
I really see something different every time? 
Or do I merely interpret what I see in a 
different w a y ? — I am inclined to say the 
first. But why? Well, interpreting is a 
procedure. . . . Seeing is not an action 
but a state. (Z 208)1* 
The activity of thinking, the activity of inter-
preting—in short, the flow of thought and experience 
—indicates that the figure or object I "see" is dif-
ferent in different parts of the stream. I do not 
simply see different aspects of the same object—this 
position would assume that the object (or picture) in 
itself ha3 the characteristics which the interpretation 
of elements in the stream characterizes as this picture 
(NOT "a picture of this"). I do not "see" a this whose 
"aspects" can be said to change according to my interpre-
tation: "we see, not change of aspect, but change of 
interpretation" (Z_ 216)—that is, the stream is said to 
"change," but not the objects (or pictures) in the 
stream: "I really see something different every time." 
It is only in terms of the stream that I can really 
speak about "this" picture, this experience; only when 
we go back and try to "see" what happened in the stream 
(i.e., when we take a slice of or freeze the stream) are 
we able to get a "picture"—hopefully one with blurred 
edges—of the stream at that point: "It is only if 
someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, 
that it makes sense to say he has had this experience. . 
. . We talk, we utter words, and only later get a 
picture of their life" (PI_, p. 209). 
The picture metaphor is necessary to the descrip-
tion of understanding and meaning; otherwise, the 
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objects of experience would all run together, becoming 
so blurred that we would not have any "stopping-places" 
around which to develop relatively stable meanings for 
the words we use. The flowing, doing, thinking 
["to interpret is to think" (PI, p. 212)1, interpreting 
characteristics of meaning are important; but if we 
fail to include the picture character of meaning, then 
our description of meaning will be incomplete: "for 
'to mean it' did not mean: to think of it" (PI 692). 
When someone says the word 'cube' to me, for 
example, I know what it means. But can the 
whole use of the word come before my mind, 
when I understand it in this way? Well, 
but on the other hand isn't the meaning of 
the word also determined by this use? And 
can these ways of determining meaning con-
flict? . . . What really comes before our 
mind when we understand .a word? Isn't 
it something like a picture? Can't it be_ 
a picture? (PI 692) 
Indeed, when I understand a word, it is meaningful 
because it is something like a picture—but, it is this 
or that picture because it is seen in terms of this or 
that use. What is it that I know when I say I know 
what the word "cube" means?,—Nothing more than the fact 
that I could form a picture (or pictures) of a cube 
depending upon what part of the stream of experience I 
select—i.e., depending upon what I am "thinking" about 
when I use the word "cube": "What I can see something 
as, is what it can be a picture of. . . . What this 
means is: the aspects in a change of aspects are those 
ones which the figure might sometimes have permanently 
in a picture" (PI, p. 201). When we assume that the 
picture takes primacy over the stream, we are forced 
into making statements such as the one just quoted: 
we are forced to speak about a figure having aspects 
which are "sometimes permanent." This awkward juxta-
position of the temporary and the permanent should 
indicate to us that there is something strange (indeed 
something wrong) in assuming that the picture is the 
permanent thing here and that interpretations of its 
aspects are what characterize its being a part of the 
stream of experience. 
This does not rule out, however, the possibility 
that certain pictures come to mind when I use a word 
more readily than other pictures. Those pictures are 
more "familiar" to me whose elements or intentions (or 
whose combination of both elements and structures) are 
echoing in the present place in my stream of experience. 
When I see a shape, therefore, it is not just any shape 
— i t is not a pure possibility: it is a shape which is 
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familiar to me because of the fact that at some previous 
point in the stream it became a real possibility for 
experience, an object with a "familiar pattern": 
This shape that I s e e — I want to s a y — i s not 
simply a shape; it is one of the shapes I 
know; it is a shape marked out in advance. 
It is one of those shapes of which I already 
had a pattern in me; and only because it 
corresponds to such a pattern is it this 
familiar shape. (I as it were carry a 
catalogue of such shapes around with me, 
and the objects portrayed in it are the . 
familiar ones.) (Z 209) 
The patterns or paths which are familiar to me are 
familiar because of the continuity of relation in the 
stream of experience. The stream thus provides the 
unifying force necessary for considering objects as 
familiar: they are related to one another, and re-
semble one another, by virtue of their being objects of 
a personal stream of experience. 
Concluding Remarks 
It should be apparent by now that underlying Wittgen-
stein's discussion of meaning as use is a recurring 
theme: words are meaningful because they are used in 
the context of personal experience. When they are taken 
out of this context they, lose in liveliness and inten-
sity while possibly gaining in immediate clarity. The 
important word here however is "possibly": the taking 
of a slice of the stream of experience is always accord-
ing to an interpretation and, therefore, is always open 
to (and indeed fosters) incompletedness by setting out 
the whole matrix of interrelatedness which seems to be 
at the basis of all life and thought (viz. logic). But 
in the process, we are drawn further and further away 
from the actual and really meaningful stream of personal 
experience toward the cold and lifeless realm of pure 
possibility. Indeed, in the process of trying to clar-
ify the meanings of the words we use, the appeal to the 
logical basis of interrelationships has resulted in 
providing a treatment which does away with the illness 
of having unclear meanings for words, but at the expense 
of the life of the language. It is the drastic surgery 
entailed in a logical analysis of language which 
Wittgenstein wants to call us away from; in fact, his 
purpose appears to be to re-orient the way we speak 
about language. Perhaps, in such a re-orientation, we 
might see something inherently destructive and alien to 
language in logical clarity and preciseness. We might 
also see that such logical clarity might constitute what 
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is often referred to as "the 
tion of language" instead of 
venting such a deterioration 
present, on-going deteriora-
acting äs a means of pre-
Saint Louis university 
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NOTES 
*In general, I have focused my attention on 
the PI^ (Anscombe translation) and !Z (Anscombe trans-
lation) , and* in a number of places I have made some 
silent emendations of the English translations. 
The numbers which follow the title abbreviation 
refer to the sections of Z and the first part of 
the M from which the quotations are taken; page 
numbers are given for quotations taken from the 
second part of PI and from the footnotes of the 
first part. All underlining is that of Wittgen-
stein. 
^Here, two uses of the word "picture" [Bild] 
should be distinguished: first, it functions as a 
term within a theory of language (especially that 
found in the Tractatus); and secondly, it functions 
as a methodological or meta-level term in associa-
tion with the "field" or "state" interpretation 
of meaning—as opposed to the "stream" interpreta-
tion of meaning. The second usage is most important 
in the PI and Z. In these later works, Wittgenstein 
uses "picture" sometimes in one way, sometimes in 
another. This is why I have usad the less Tractatus-
colored term of "field" to refer to the static aspect 
of meaning expressed in the later works. (In clarify-
ing this distinction, I owe thanks to Dr. John Carlson.) 
"*0n the fact that we should always allow the 
image before our mind some fluidity, Wittgenstein 
writes: "Always get rid of the idea of the private 
object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, 
but that you do not notice the change because your 
memory constantly decieves you" (PI, p. 207). 
Also cf. Z 33: "It often strikes us as if 
in grasping meaning the mind made small rudimentary 
movements, like someone irresolute who does not 
know which way to go—i.e., it tentatively reviews 
the field {Gebiet] of possible applications 
(Anwendungen]."" . 
And Z^  138: "It looks as if a sentence with, 
e.g., the word "ball 1 in it already contained the 
shadow of other uses [Verwendungen] of this word. 
That is to say, the possibility of forming those 
other sentences." 
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A 
For example, see Z 233; PI 71, 97, 607, 609, 
p. 181, p. 212. 
5 
The shift from Wittgenstein's concentration on 
the importance of "logical space" (in the Tractatus) to 
the importance of "the space of intentions" (in the PI 
and Z) is the shift away from the primacy of possibility 
to tHe primacy of actuality. Cf. infra, pp. 12-13. 
6See Z 41: "If I say 'I was then going to do 
such-and-such",' and if this statement is based on the 
thoughts, images, etc. which I remember, then someone 
else to whom I tell only these thoughts, images, etc. 
ought to be able to infer with as great a certainty as 
mine that I was then going to do such-and-such.—But 
often he could not do so. Indeed, were I myself to in-
fer my intention from the evidence, other people would 
be right to say that this conclusion was very uncertain." 
7 
See Z 373: "Concepts other than, though akin 
to, ours migh"t sound very queer to us; deviations from 
the usual in an unusual direction." 
2 381: "For the indefiniteness of our concept 
may be projected for us into the object that the word 
designates. So that if the indefiniteness were missing 
we should also not have 'the same thing meant.' The 
picture that we employ symbolizes the indefiniteness." 
Z_ 379: "And others have concepts that cut across 
ours." 
Z_ 387: "For I want to say: an education quite 
different from ours might also be the foundation for 
quite different concepts." 
Z 388: "For here life would run on differently. 
— W h a t Interests us would not interest them. Here dif-
ferent concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In 
fact, this is the only way in which essentially different 
concepts are imaginable." 
This should be kept in mind particularly in the 
following section of this article. 
9 
Also cf. Z 178; "The peculiar experience of 
meaning is characterized by the fact that we come out 
with an explanation and use the past tense." (Note how 
this whole discussion of trying to determine the mean-
ingfulness of language in the stream is the linguistic 
application of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.) 
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It should be noted parenthetically that this 
discussion of content and intention echoes in crucial 
in interpreting Wittgenstein's private language argument. 
Cf. infra, note 11. 
***The similarity of the terms "familiar" and 
"familial" is not simply coincidental. For Wittgenstein, 
family resemblances have meaning insofar as they are con-
sidered as relationships of familarity in streams of 
personal experience. Insofar as such streams overlap 
in coinciding "forms of life," the meanings of our words 
are psychologically grounded in such a way as to negate 
the possibility of meaningful private languages. The 
key to Wittgenstein's family resemblances argument might 
be found in understanding objects as related to one 
another intentionally—that is, in terms of how they 
are, in fact, related as familiar in a stream or streams 
of experience. This familiartiy in the stream becomes 
the basis for ontological claims and for Wittgenstein's 
Investigations and Zettel descriptions of the logical 
and pictorial (static or field) theories of meaning. 
The converse—that logical or pictorial theories of 
meaning act as the basis for meaning in the stream of 
experience—apparently is much less true of the later 
Wittgenstein than of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. 
Frank Ebersole is feeling his way toward this 
interpretation of Wittgenstein when he notes that 
"Wittgenstein writes as though 'being related to one 
another' and 'having relationships' were pretty much 
the same thing." Cf. Frank B. Ebersole, "Reconsidering 
Some Passages in Wittgenstein," Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 2 (1972), p. 24. 
12 
Cf. Z 293: "I give the rules of a game. The 
other party makes a move, perfectly in accord with the 
rules, whose possibility I had not forseen, and which 
spoils the game, that is, as I had wanted it to be. I 
now have to say: 'I gave bad rules; I must change or 
perhaps add to my rules.' So in this way have I a 
picture of the game in advance? In a sense: Yes." 
PI 125: "The fundamental fact here is that we 
lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then 
when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we 
had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled 
in our own rules. This entanglement in our rules is 
what we want to understand (i.e., get a clear view o f ) . 
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. 
For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we 
had meant, forseen. That is just what we say when, for 
example, a contradiction appears: 'I didn't mean it 
like that.•" 
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Cf. also p. 212: "Do I really see something 
different each time, or do I only interpret what I see 
in a different way? I am inclined to say the former. 
But w h y ? — T o interpret is to think, to do something; 
seeing is a state." 
